Original photograph displayed without cropping. Responsive WebP copies resized without cropping.
Geographic context
Bengaluru International Airport
Dubai International Airport
The flight operated from Bengaluru to Dubai. The summary identifies Dubai International Airport as the place of occurrence and gives no position for the top of descent. The markers show approximate airport locations. Basemap: Natural Earth, public domain.Read supporting evidence
During the flight from Bengaluru to Dubai, the commander developed a headache and nausea. Near the top of descent, he felt that he was about to faint and passed control to the copilot. A senior cabin crewmember secured him in his seat. The copilot declared a MAYDAY and landed at Dubai without injury or aircraft damage.
Read the full incident Follow what happened, from the flight to the investigation findings.
What investigators concluded
The AAIS could not determine the cause of the fainting attack. It found that crew coordination and communication worked well, the aircraft was airworthy, and no aircraft defect contributed to the serious incident.
Control handover before the commander lost consciousness
884 words / about 5 minutes to read. The official report for this event is short, so this account is shorter than most and covers only what the report documents.
A round trip to Bengaluru
On 22 October 2014, Emirates Boeing 777-21H (ER) A6-EMJ operated a passenger round trip between Dubai and Bengaluru. The commander had rested for approximately six hours before reporting for duty. He described waking refreshed, consumed black coffee and travelled to the airport in company transport. His flying hours and duty time were within the regulatory and operator limits. The aircraft left Dubai at 0330 UTC, and the three and a half hour outward flight was uneventful.
Both pilots stayed on board during the ground stop at Bengaluru. The commander ate his first meal of the day, consisting of a muffin, an omelet and fruit. The flight back to Dubai departed at 1026 local time, with the commander as pilot flying and the copilot as pilot monitoring. About one hour after departure, the commander developed a headache and nausea. He took two pain relief tablets from the aircraft first aid kit and visited the bathroom several times.
The nausea was unaccompanied by vomiting. The commander had a persistent mild headache, but developed no fever, chest pain or diarrhea. At the top of descent his condition changed: he suddenly felt nauseous, could not focus and felt that he was about to faint. He announced the transfer of control to the copilot before losing consciousness.
The copilot saw the commander trying to stand, then losing consciousness and falling back into his seat. He took control of the aircraft and called the senior cabin crewmember to the cockpit. The cabin crewmember secured the unconscious commander in his seat. Approximately three minutes after the collapse, the commander regained consciousness. He could communicate and interact, but told the copilot that he was unable to assist with the landing.
The copilot continued flying and declared a MAYDAY for pilot incapacitation. Air traffic control immediately gave the flight priority. The aircraft landed at Dubai International Airport at approximately 1238 local time. The controller consulted airport management and decided that an emergency phase declaration was unnecessary. After parking, the crew shut down the engines and the passengers disembarked normally. There were no injuries to passengers or crew and no damage to the aircraft.
Paramedics boarded and gave oxygen to the commander. He was then able to walk off the aircraft, and they accompanied him to the airport clinic. An electrocardiogram and blood pressure examinations produced normal results. He subsequently attended the operator's clinic. After the medical assessment, the GCAA suspended his medical certificate.
Both pilots held GCAA airline transport pilot licences with Boeing 777 type ratings and valid class 1 medical certificates. The commander had completed his proficiency checks, had 17,787 flying hours and had worked for Emirates since 1988. In February 2014, he had attended the operator's clinic with stress, tiredness and anxiety. A specialist assessment diagnosed a mood disorder. He underwent a dizziness assessment and passed a functional simulator test covering handling, scanning, situation awareness and decision making.
The commander responded well to treatment and resumed flying in May 2014. Reinstatement followed the GCAA aeromedical guidance and involved two approved psychiatrists. His medical certificate required monthly aeromedical examiner reviews and regular psychiatric reviews. The psychiatrists' assessments supplied to the investigation found him fit for duty. His monthly examination took place two days before the incident, and the examiner referred him for a psychiatric review in accordance with the certificate limitation.
At the operator's clinic approximately two hours after the incident, a doctor found the commander tired and referred him for further assessments and tests. The results were normal. On 31 December 2014, he experienced another fainting episode while alone in his accommodation, fell and injured his head. Hospital examinations found no abnormalities. Further specialist assessments in January 2015 found no neurological or neuropsychological explanation. In May 2015, following the Senior Aeromedical Board recommendation, the GCAA revoked his medical certificate because of the unexplained falling attacks.
Emirates' operations manuals addressed incapacitation for both flight and cabin crew. Flight crew guidance required the remaining pilot to declare an emergency and land as soon as practical, while flying from the normal position. Cabin crew guidance covered pilot seats and restraints, moving the incapacitated pilot away from the controls, securing the pilot and moving the seat backwards to enable removal from the cockpit.
The AAIS found the emergency policies and procedures adequate. Initial and recurrent training helped the crew recognise the emergency correctly. The commander warned the copilot before fainting, allowing him to take over control. The senior cabin crewmember secured the commander with his seat belt while the copilot continued flying. Investigators found that cockpit and cabin communication was appropriate and that the timely, accurate exchange of safety information contributed to a safe landing.
The AAIS found that the aircraft was certified, equipped and maintained in accordance with UAE regulations and was airworthy when released to service. It identified no aircraft defect or malfunction that contributed to the incident. The crew were qualified, adequately rested and operating within the published flight and duty limitations.
The AAIS could not determine the cause of the commander's fainting attack, and the risk of recurrence remained undetermined. Its review of earlier incapacitation investigations found that Emirates had implemented all the previously identified safety improvement opportunities. It issued no additional safety recommendations for this occurrence. The completed investigation was published on 12 February 2018 as a seven-page summary report.
A simplified reading of the investigation findings. The sequence does not replace the full report or imply that every contributing factor is shown.
Sequence of events
The summary gives the Bengaluru departure as 1026 local time and the Dubai landing as approximately 1238 local time. Earlier departure from Dubai is stated in UTC. Untimed events use the reported sequence. Expand an event to see its evidence.
Before the round tripRest and duty limits
The commander rested for approximately six hours before duty. His flying hours and duty time were within regulatory and operator limits.
After a further episode and specialist assessments, the GCAA revoked the commander's medical certificate following the Senior Aeromedical Board recommendation.
At the top of descent, the commander told the copilot to take control before losing consciousness. The copilot took over and called the senior cabin crewmember.
Why were no additional safety recommendations made?
The AAIS found that Emirates had implemented all the safety improvement opportunities identified in its previous investigations of pilot incapacitation.
The published summary includes the flight sequence, selected medical findings, procedural analysis and conclusions. It supplies no occupant total, precise top of descent coordinates, detailed medical test results or recorder transcript.
The summary names EK565 for the outward Dubai to Bengaluru sector. It gives no flight number for the return sector during which the commander became incapacitated.
Actions and recommendations are described at the dates of the cited records. A recommendation is not proof of implementation.
Medical certificate action
The GCAA suspended the commander's medical certificate after the incident assessment and revoked it in May 2015 following the Senior Aeromedical Board recommendation.
The AAIS found that Emirates had implemented all the safety improvement opportunities from previous incapacitation investigations and issued no additional recommendations for this occurrence.
The AAIS found that initial and recurrent training helped the crewmembers identify the situation correctly. Emirates had adequate emergency policies and procedures.
Matching dossiers for Unexplained fainting: No other dossier in this collection.
Read alongside
These comparisons connect specific research topics. Shared circumstances do not establish identical causes. Evidence from both investigations is provided below.
Both flights required the copilot to fly while cabin crew assisted the commander. On A6-EMJ, the commander passed control before fainting and was secured in his seat. On British Airways 5390, a windscreen failed and the commander was partly pulled through the opening; cabin crew held him while the copilot landed at Southampton.
Explore the records below for additional context. They open on the publisher's site and are not all included in our report search. Source reuse terms apply.
Completed investigation published as a summary on 12 February 2018, including flight history, medical findings, crew response and conclusions.
Sources and transparency
The GCAA AAIS issued the completed investigation as a summary report on 12 February 2018.
Source limitations
The published document is a seven-page investigation summary. It omits passenger and cabin crew totals, the exact position and altitude at incapacitation, detailed medical test results, flight recorder analysis and a cockpit voice recorder transcript.
Pilot Incapacitation: Emirates Boeing 777-21H (ER) A6-EMJ
UAE GCAA Air Accident Investigation Sector Final investigation summary report AIFN/0017/2014, issued 12 February 2018
Kevin Murphy writes the incident accounts on AirlineIncidents.com, out of a long interest in aviation safety and the lessons each investigation leaves behind.
Prepared by
AirlineIncidents editorial desk
Report citation check
Independent expert review
Not completed
Citation checks compare supporting text with the indexed report pages. They do not constitute independent expert review. How these pages are prepared.
Revision history
: Published sourced incident account, timeline, photographs and investigation findings.