This is the aircraft involved in Flight 32, photographed during an earlier departure. The view shows its four-engine layout; it does not depict the engine failure, damage to the wing or the return to Singapore.
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Geographic context
Singapore Changi (departure and return)
Batam Island reference
Sydney (planned destination)
Approximate airport and geographical reference positions. This schematic shows the planned journey and relevant locations, not a recorded flight track. Basemap: Natural Earth, public domain.Read supporting evidence
About four minutes after takeoff, a turbine disc burst in the No. 2 engine while the A380 climbed through about 7,000 feet. High-energy debris damaged the wing, fuel tanks, wiring and several aircraft systems. The crew held east of Singapore while assessing the failures and completing procedures. With reduced braking, unavailable leading-edge devices and limited reverse thrust, they checked controllability and calculated a landing on Runway 20C. The aircraft landed and stopped with about 150 metres of runway remaining. Leaking fuel and a No. 1 engine that would not shut down complicated the ground response. Passengers left using stairs on the right side. No injuries were confirmed.
Read the full incident Follow what happened, from the flight to the investigation findings.
What investigators concluded
The ATSB traced the engine failure to a fatigue crack in an oil feed stub pipe with a wall thinner than the design required. Escaping oil ignited internally, heat damaged the intermediate-pressure turbine disc attachment, and the separated disc accelerated beyond its capacity and burst. The investigation identified manufacturing and non-conformance management problems, and called for certification guidance to absorb the damage lessons. It separately found that the flight and cabin crew managed the emergency competently. That finding should not be recast as a crew-error cause.
1,739 words / about 8 minutes to read. Based on the investigation records cited below.
Two bangs shortly after takeoff
Qantas flight 32 left Singapore Changi for Sydney on 4 November 2010. The Airbus A380, registered VH-OQA, carried 440 passengers, 24 cabin crew and five flight crew. The normal operating pilots and relief second officer were accompanied by a check captain under training and a supervising check captain. All five flight crew were on the flight deck when the emergency began. The extra pilots were part of that flight's staffing circumstances, rather than a normal requirement for every A380 departure.
Takeoff from runway 20C was normal. The crew retracted the landing gear and flaps and selected climb thrust. About four minutes after departure, while the aircraft climbed through 7,000 feet at 250 knots, they heard two almost simultaneous loud bangs. The captain selected heading and altitude hold. The aircraft yawed slightly and levelled off, but the automatic thrust system was no longer active. The captain manually reduced the thrust levers to control the speed.
The electronic centralised aircraft monitoring system, or ECAM, first presented a number 2 engine turbine-overheat warning. More messages followed. The captain confirmed that he was flying and directed the first officer to work through the displayed procedures. The crew initially brought the affected engine to idle and monitored it. A brief fire warning appeared before the display returned to the overheat procedure. The emergency was already extending beyond the sound of the initial failure: the pilots were receiving evidence of several problems without yet knowing the full extent of the damage.
The crew shut down number 2 engine as part of the overheat response. A damage assessment indicated that the engine was seriously damaged, and they attempted to discharge its fire extinguishers. They did not receive the expected confirmation of discharge, despite repeated attempts. The engine display showed the affected engine as failed and indicated degraded or alternate modes for the other engines. These indications did not mean that all the remaining engines had failed, but they added to the information the crew needed to assess.
The aircraft remained controllable and had ample fuel. After discussing an immediate return, a climb and a hold, the crew chose to remain near Singapore while processing the messages and associated procedures. They repeatedly reviewed that decision and the fuel available. Controllers initially offered a holding area east of the airport. The crew requested a position within 30 nautical miles of Changi, and the aircraft was directed into an approximately 20-nautical-mile racetrack hold at 7,400 feet.
Air traffic control also relayed reports that aircraft components had been found on Batam Island. On board, cabin crew and passengers had seen left-wing damage and fuel escaping. The second officer entered the cabin to inspect what could be seen. A passenger who was also an airline pilot drew his attention to the tail-camera display, which showed the leak. He then inspected the wing from the lower deck and returned to describe the damage to the other pilots. The view from the cabin added information that the cockpit warnings alone could not provide.
Working through the initial ECAM procedures took about 50 minutes. The crew decided against further fuel transfers after additional fuel-system warnings because they could not be sure of the system's integrity. They also could not jettison fuel because of damage to fuel-management functions. The aircraft therefore had to be assessed in the condition it actually retained, with its current weight and damaged systems, rather than on the assumption that normal fuel handling remained available.
Landing-distance calculations were complicated by several failures at once. Leading-edge lift devices were inoperative, braking capability was reduced, fewer spoilers were available and the left inboard engine's thrust reverser was inactive. The crew initially had difficulty obtaining a usable landing-performance calculation because of the number of malfunctions. They eventually determined that a landing could be achieved within the runway distance available at Changi and continued on that basis.
The captain advised the cabin service manager that a runway overrun and evacuation were possible, and cabin crew prepared accordingly. Controllers were told that the aircraft was leaking fuel and needed emergency services on landing. Before leaving the hold, the pilots conducted manual handling checks and assessed controllability. They requested a long final approach. Their work during the hold was directed towards a practical question: whether they could configure, fly and stop the damaged aircraft on the available runway. The answer depended on the combined effects of the failures, not just the loss of one engine.
As the aircraft was progressively configured for landing, the crew repeated handling checks. The landing gear needed its emergency extension procedure, which uses gravity rather than the normal extension method. Singapore controllers positioned the aircraft about 20 nautical miles from the threshold and provided a staged descent. The captain used symmetrical thrust from engines 1 and 4 and adjusted speed with engine 3. This arrangement accommodated the remaining engines and the particular damage to their control systems.
The autopilot had remained usable during the hold and much of the procedural work. The captain disconnected it for manual control checks and then re-engaged it. It automatically disconnected twice on approach in response to its programmed angle-of-attack functions. After the second disconnection, at about 800 feet, the captain continued manually for the remainder of the approach. The report describes these system responses as part of the sequence, rather than evidence that the aircraft had become uncontrollable.
The A380 touched down at 03:46:47 UTC. The captain applied braking and reverse thrust on engine 3, the surviving engine with an available reverser. The pilots initially perceived the deceleration as slow, but braking and reverse thrust reduced the speed. As it approached 60 knots, the captain recalled becoming confident that the remaining distance was sufficient. The aircraft stopped approximately 150 metres from the runway end. Emergency services attended it. Landing had resolved the immediate problem of bringing the damaged aircraft back to the ground, but fuel leakage, very hot brakes and an engine that would not shut down created a further emergency on the runway.
A controlled disembarkation beside a running engine
The crew started shutting down the remaining engines after stopping. When the final engine master switch was moved off, most cockpit displays went blank and only one very-high-frequency radio remained available. Shortly beforehand, pilots had seen a left body landing-gear brake temperature of about 900 degrees Celsius and rising. Firefighters then reported that engine 1 was still running, although the crew had already selected it off. Repeated operation of its master switch did not stop it.
The crew tried the fire push button and extinguisher bottles, also without success. The fire commander reported fuel leaking from the left wing. Firefighters laid a foam blanket over the leak, and the pilots advised them about the hot brakes. With the fire risk being managed and reduced, the crew assessed how best to get passengers off. They chose a precautionary disembarkation using stairs on the right side rather than immediately using escape slides.
One door was used so that passengers could be counted and the remaining right-side doors could stay available for an emergency evacuation. Cabin crew remained at the armed doors until the passengers were clear. Stairs arrived about 35 minutes after landing, and disembarkation began about 50 minutes after touchdown. The last passengers left about an hour later. Attempts to stop engine 1 continued with airline and maintenance assistance. Ultimately, firefighters used water and foam, and the engine stopped about three hours after landing. The final report records no injuries to crew or passengers and no confirmed injuries to people on Batam Island.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau reconstructed a failure that started inside engine 2. A fatigue crack had developed in a thin section of an oil-feed stub pipe. On the occurrence flight, normal engine movement opened it enough to release oil into the high-pressure and intermediate-pressure bearing assembly's buffer space. The leaked oil ignited in that hot environment. The resulting sustained internal fire damaged the intermediate-pressure turbine disc and its drive arrangement.
The disc separated from its drive arm and accelerated. Its behaviour differed from the manufacturer's modelling and experience with other engines in the Trent family. It exceeded its design rotational capacity and burst. Debris escaped the engine and damaged the airframe and multiple systems. This was an uncontained turbine failure, meaning that the engine's surrounding structure did not retain the dangerous fragments. The system damage experienced by the crew followed from that release of debris.
The investigation linked the vulnerable pipe to manufacturing. Movement of the hub during machining had produced a critically reduced wall thickness in the counterbore region. It was probable that a measuring machine had reported a non-conforming bore location, but that the non-conformance was not detected or declared by inspection personnel. The assembly consequently entered service with the thin section. The report also examined later opportunities to assess the risk in engines already in use, including weaknesses in statistical analysis, communication of uncertainty and the approval process for concessions. These findings concerned the chain that allowed a manufacturing problem to remain in the operating fleet.
The ATSB found that the damaged aircraft remained capable of continued safe flight and landing, and that the crew operated in accordance with standard procedures and practices. Its analysis therefore concentrated on the engine failure and the processes that had allowed non-conforming engines into service. This distinction matters: the long procedural response was part of managing the consequences, while the initiating mechanism was a manufacturing-related pipe failure and internal fire.
Qantas grounded its A380 fleet on the day of the occurrence. The report records a phased return beginning on 27 November 2010 after further analysis and safety measures. Focused inspection action followed, including revised Rolls-Royce assessment and rejection criteria for the affected pipes and a shortened compliance period of two flight cycles. The Australian regulator also issued a maintenance direction. These responses sought to find and remove the specific vulnerable conditions before another engine reached the same failure sequence.
A December 2010 bulletin introduced revised engine-management software with intermediate-pressure turbine overspeed protection intended to stop the engine before the disc reached a critical burst speed. The report documents other recommendations and responses separately, so a recommendation should not be treated as proof of universal implementation today. Flight 32's account combines a manufacturing failure, widespread damage and a carefully managed return. The successful landing did not make the consequences of the burst minor: the post-landing engine problem and lengthy disembarkation show how much of the emergency remained after the aircraft stopped.
Follow the main stages, then open the evidence beneath each step.
1
Oil-feed pipe fails
A fatigue crack in an oil-feed stub pipe allowed oil to leak into the engine. The investigation linked the pipe condition to the manufacturing process.
The emergency required management of aircraft and system damage. A surviving engine could not be shut down normally after landing and was eventually stopped using water and foam.
During climb through 7,000 feet, two near-simultaneous bangs were heard. The captain selected altitude and heading hold and controlled thrust manually because autothrust was no longer active.
The crew transmitted a PAN call while assessing the No. 2 engine overheat indication. They subsequently shut that engine down and continued the failure procedure.
The aircraft held east of Singapore at 7,400 feet. A cabin inspection confirmed wing damage and a fuel leak. Initial ECAM procedures took about 50 minutes to complete.
Before the return approachLanding performance and handling checked
The crew established that a landing within the available runway was achievable despite multiple failures, then checked controllability. Landing gear extension required the emergency procedure.
About 50 minutes after landingPrecautionary disembarkation begins
With fuel leaking and No. 1 still running, passengers began leaving through a right-side lower-deck door using stairs. The last passengers left about an hour later.
Why was an engine still running after the aircraft landed?
Normal and alternative shutdown attempts for the No. 1 engine were unsuccessful. It was eventually stopped using water and firefighting foam about three hours after landing.
Were people on Batam confirmed injured by falling debris?
The final report records no confirmed injuries to people on Batam, as well as no reported injuries to passengers or crew. Early unconfirmed accounts should not replace that final finding.
What made the engine failure affect so many systems?
The No. 2 engine failure was uncontained. Escaping turbine debris damaged the surrounding airframe and systems, so the event was more than the loss of one source of thrust.
A safety recommendation is not the same as an implemented change
The report separately documents recommendations, manufacturer responses and regulator directions. Their status is stated at the report date, without assuming that every subsequent action is complete.
Actions and recommendations are described at the dates of the cited records. A recommendation is not proof of implementation.
Recorded action: grounding and phased return
Qantas grounded its A380 fleet on 4 November 2010 and began reintroducing it on 27 November after analysis and additional safety measures described in the report.
After ATSB recommendation AO-2010-089-SR-012, Rolls-Royce revised its bulletin to include assessment and rejection criteria and tightened compliance to two flight cycles. CASA also issued a maintenance direction.
The report records a 3 December 2010 bulletin introducing revised engine-management software with intermediate-pressure turbine overspeed protection intended to stop the engine before critical disc burst speed.
Using stairs rather than immediate evacuation was judged likely the safest option given the managed threat and potentially hazardous external conditions.
Matching dossiers for Controlled disembarkation: No other dossier in this collection.
Read alongside
These comparisons connect specific research topics. Shared circumstances do not establish identical causes. Evidence from both investigations is provided below.
Both events show engine debris creating an airframe emergency. Qantas 32 involved a turbine-disc burst and widespread system damage; Southwest 1380 involved a fan-blade failure whose loads and departing cowl components led to a cabin window loss.
Explore the records below for additional context. They open on the publisher's site and are not all included in our report search. Source reuse terms apply.
Official investigation overview, report and safety-issue follow-up.
Sources and transparency
Checked against the ATSB final report, including its final injury statement. No independent expert review.
Source limitations
This page follows the final report rather than the preliminary report, which mentioned unconfirmed ground injuries. The cockpit recorder did not capture the complete occurrence through passenger disembarkation. Relative ground intervals are approximate; the investigation distinguishes contributing safety factors, other safety factors and other key findings.
ATSB AO-2010-089: In-flight uncontained engine failure, Airbus A380-842 VH-OQA, overhead Batam Island, 4 November 2010
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Final report, 27 June 2013
Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Commonwealth content licensed CC BY 3.0 Australia; Coat of Arms, ATSB logo and third-party photos/graphics excluded. Only limited text excerpts used. Source terms / provenance.
Kevin Murphy writes the incident accounts on AirlineIncidents.com, out of a long interest in aviation safety and the lessons each investigation leaves behind.
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: Checked report citations and source hashes. Added credited photographs, geographic context, sequence diagrams, reader answers, evidence limits, report-era safety follow-up, further records, sourced incident comparisons and this editorial record.
: Added a full chronological account with section-level report references and links from the short summary.
