LEVEL 3 Final report

Based on the investigation authority's final report.

Date
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Occurrence
Uncommanded engine shutdown
Location
Climb after departure from Dubai International Airport, United Arab Emirates
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Operator
Qantas Airways Limited
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Aircraft
Airbus A380-842
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Registration
VH-OQL
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Route
Dubai to London; returned to Dubai
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People aboard
503: 484 passengers and 19 crew
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Fatalities
0
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Survivors
503
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Topics
Maintenance, Mechanical failure, Component design, Manufacturing and quality control

This photograph is cropped for the banner. See the full photograph, credit, licence and what it shows.

Photographs and geographic context

Qantas Airbus A380 VH-OQL parked at London Heathrow in wet weather.

VH-OQL at London Heathrow on 30 December 2011.

Photo: John Taggart, CC BY-SA 2.0

Image info

The incident aircraft photographed before the Dubai engine shutdown.

Image source

Original photograph used in full. Responsive WebP copies resized without cropping.

Geographic context

Geographical orientation for Qantas VH-OQLDubai International Airport: departure and return; London: planned destination. Approximate geographic markers for Dubai and London. The engine shutdown occurred during the climb from Dubai at approximately 2,000 ft. The GCAA gives no coordinates for the shutdown.12NORTH UP / SCHEMATIC / NOT A RECORDED FLIGHT TRACK
  1. Dubai International Airport: departure and return
  2. London: planned destination
Approximate geographic markers for Dubai and London. The engine shutdown occurred during the climb from Dubai at approximately 2,000 ft. The GCAA gives no coordinates for the shutdown. Basemap: Natural Earth, public domain.
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What happened

Mechanical damage in the step aside gearbox interrupted drive to the external gearbox. The fuel and oil pumps lost their drive and the engine shut down. The GCAA identified insufficient clamping at the lower support bearing joint as the primary root cause.

Read the full incident Follow what happened, from the flight to the investigation findings.

What investigators concluded

The crew declared PAN, attempted a restart, jettisoned fuel and landed at Dubai at approximately 2249 UTC. Gearbox bolt torque, assembly procedures and shaft balancing were changed during the investigation. The GCAA issued no safety recommendations.

Evidence behind this explanation
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLActions taken by the engine manufacturer | Printed page 6 | PDF page 7Find this passage in evidence search

Gearbox failure during the Dubai climb

877 words / about 4 minutes to read. The official report for this event is short, so this account is shorter than most and covers only what the report documents.

A debris warning before departure

On 27 March 2014, Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQL was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Dubai to London. Its four engines were Rolls-Royce Trent 900s. There were 484 passengers and 19 crewmembers onboard, a total of 503 people. The aircraft departed Dubai International Airport at approximately 2147 UTC. Takeoff and the first part of the climb were normal.

The No. 3 engine had generated a debris advisory on the preceding flight to Dubai. Engine health monitoring recorded that message at approximately 1859 UTC. The engine continued operating without an abnormal parameter change requiring the crew's attention. During the transit at Dubai, the defect was deferred under item 79-35-01 of the onboard Minimum Equipment List. That item referred to the ENG3 OIL CHIP DETECTED message, and the aircraft was released to service.

Sources for this section
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 2 | PDF page 3Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search

Shutdown and return

At approximately 2,000 ft, the crew received an ENG FAIL warning for the No. 3 engine, the right inboard engine. It had shut down without command. All engine indications had been normal before the shutdown. A second chip detector debris message was recorded at approximately 2149 UTC, followed by the shutdown and engine failure warning.

The crew declared PAN and leveled the aircraft at 6,000 ft. They tried a starter assisted relight, which was unsuccessful. According to the crew statement, the engine's high pressure stage did not rotate. The commander then initiated fuel jettison for a return to Dubai. The aircraft landed uneventfully at approximately 2249 UTC, after about an hour in flight. None of the passengers or crewmembers was injured.

Sources for this section
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search

A break in the drive system

At the parking stand, maintenance personnel found several metal chips on the engine master chip detector. The engine showed no external damage. Its fan could windmill freely, and inspections from the front and rear found no metal in the exhaust jet pipe. The post-flight report recorded engine failure code 7100W230, which directed troubleshooting toward an engine flameout.

Manual cranking provided evidence of a disconnected drive. The external gearbox turned, but the high pressure spool did not rotate with it. The engine's fuel and oil pumps received their drive through that gearbox. Losing that drive during flight would stop the pumps and shut the engine down. An initial inspection found internal damage in the step aside gearbox, and the aircraft could not return to service after the inspection findings.

The failed engine, serial number 91137, had accumulated 12,871 hours and 1,173 cycles since new. During a June 2013 shop visit, a damaged step aside gearbox bearing support had been replaced. The engine subsequently operated for 2,224 hours and 198 cycles, all on VH-OQL. The chip detector was sent for laboratory examination after the incident, but the debris first observed on its magnet was no longer attached when it arrived.

Sources for this section
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search

Movement, wear and fatigue

Examination found fractured cast webs in the step aside gearbox's driven bevel bearing support, together with damage and displacement of the driven bevel gear. The internal, external and transfer gearboxes showed no primary or secondary damage during borescope inspection. Minor displacement at two transfer gearbox bearing locations was judged non-contributory.

The angled drive shaft had met the balance acceptance limits during manufacture, although its radial run-out had been accepted slightly above the upper tolerance. Testing after the incident found its balance outside the acceptance limits. A major quality investigation confirmed the imbalance and traced it to variability in the balancing process and insufficient controls to keep that process consistent.

Rolls-Royce and Avio examined a cracked lower bearing support from another engine. The crack had started at stress concentration features created by a wear step. Examination of the fracture surface showed high cycle fatigue. Analysis of the bearing joint found that the specified bolt torque supplied insufficient clamping to prevent movement during engine operation. The investigators identified that as the primary root cause. Shaft imbalance increased the movement and rate of wear; excessive radial run-out also contributed to imbalance at high speed.

The GCAA concluded that mechanical damage in the step aside gearbox caused loss of drive to the external gearbox. The engine shut down as drive to the fuel pump, oil pumps and generators was lost. Analysis showed that greater joint clamping, combined with a correctly balanced shaft within dimensional limits, would prevent movement and leave a reserve margin in the existing design.

Sources for this section

Changes to assembly and inspection

Avio introduced higher bolt torque, revised tightening instructions and a new balancing procedure for production and overhaul. It also introduced optical measurement of shaft run-out, applied it to new and previously operated shafts, and rejected and replaced a small number with dimensional anomalies. Cleaning, inspection and assembly instructions were revised, including measures to remove residual aluminium debris from the bearing interface.

Rolls-Royce published service bulletin RB.211-72-J023 on 9 December 2014 to increase tightening torque at 20 gearbox bolt joints. Other bulletins required hardware removal, reassessment and on-wing inspections. The report recorded completed hardware removal from 13 in-service engines and completed replacement on ten engines affected by the possibility of residual aluminium debris.

The GCAA recorded 266 engine inspections: 11 had cracks, ten had loose bolts, 17 had frettage and 218 had no findings. Work continued on washer seating and dimensional tolerances at the lower bearing joint. Shafts using a three-plane balance process became available on 28 January 2016. The completed GCAA summary report was issued on 22 March 2017. It recorded no safety recommendations.

Sources for this section
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLActions taken by the engine manufacturer | Printed page 6 | PDF page 7Find this passage in evidence search

Return to the short summary / Source status and limitations

How the sequence developed

Follow the main stages, then open the evidence beneath each step.

  1. Insufficient joint clamping

    The original specified torque could not prevent relative movement between the bearing and its lower support housing during engine operation.

    Read supporting evidence
  2. Wear and fatigue

    Movement generated wear at the lower bearing support. Examination of a support from another engine identified a fatigue crack starting at a wear step. Shaft imbalance accelerated movement and wear.

    Read supporting evidence
  3. Gearbox damage interrupts drive

    Mechanical damage in the step aside gearbox caused loss of drive to the external gearbox and the fuel and oil pumps.

    Read supporting evidence
  4. Engine shutdown and return

    The No. 3 engine shut down during the climb. A restart attempt failed, and the crew jettisoned fuel and returned to Dubai.

    Read supporting evidence

A simplified reading of the investigation findings. The sequence does not replace the full report or imply that every contributing factor is shown.

Sequence of events

Times are UTC. UAE local time was UTC plus four hours. Expand an event to see its evidence.

  1. 1859 UTC, preceding flightDebris advisory

    Engine health monitoring recorded metal debris at the No. 3 engine chip detector. Engine parameters remained normal. The defect was deferred at Dubai under MEL item 79-35-01.

    Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 2 | PDF page 3Find this passage in evidence search
    Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
    Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
  2. Approximately 2147 UTCDeparture for London

    The scheduled passenger flight departed Dubai with 503 people onboard. Takeoff and the initial climb were normal.

  3. Approximately 2149 UTCEngine shuts down in the climb

    A second debris message was recorded after departure. The No. 3 engine shut down without command at approximately 2,000 ft and an ENG FAIL warning appeared.

    Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
  4. At 6,000 ftRestart attempt and fuel jettison

    The crew declared PAN and leveled at 6,000 ft. A starter assisted relight failed, and the commander initiated fuel jettison for the return.

  5. Approximately 2249 UTCReturn to Dubai

    The aircraft landed uneventfully. No passengers or crewmembers were injured.

  6. After landingInternal damage found

    Metal chips were found on the engine detector. The external gearbox could be turned manually, but the high pressure spool did not turn with it. Inspection found damage in the step aside gearbox.

    Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search

Search the report evidence

Search extracted report prose, with original page references. Short results link to the full document.

Questions readers ask

How many people were onboard?

There were 503 occupants: 484 passengers and 19 crew. All returned to Dubai without injury.

What did the first ground inspection show?

The detector contained metal chips and the engine had no external damage. Manual cranking turned the external gearbox while the high pressure spool remained stationary.

Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLInitial inspection following the Incident flight | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search
Did the GCAA issue recommendations?

The GCAA issued no safety recommendations. Its completed summary report recorded manufacturer changes to gearbox assembly, shaft balancing and inspection.

Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLActions taken by the engine manufacturer | Printed page 6 | PDF page 7Find this passage in evidence search

What the evidence can and cannot establish

Safety follow-up

Actions and recommendations are described at the dates of the cited records. A recommendation is not proof of implementation.

Production and overhaul changes

The gearbox manufacturer introduced higher torque, revised assembly and cleaning instructions, new shaft balancing and optical run-out measurement.

Read supporting evidence

Fleet containment

The GCAA recorded hardware removal from 13 in-service engines and replacement on ten engines subject to the aluminium debris concern. Fleet inspections identified cracks, loose bolts and frettage.

Read supporting evidence

Further balancing and joint work

The report recorded continued work on washer seating and incorporation of improved shafts. Three-plane balanced shafts were available from 28 January 2016.

Read supporting evidence

Classifications, with reasons

These labels organise the evidence. They are not a ranking of causes. A shared label means a shared research topic, not an identical mechanism.

CauseMechanical failure

Step aside gearbox damage caused loss of drive to the external gearbox and an uncommanded engine shutdown.

Primary root causeComponent design

The specified bolt torque provided insufficient clamping to prevent movement at the lower bearing support joint.

Contributing factorManufacturing and quality control

Angled drive shaft imbalance exacerbated movement and wear. The quality investigation identified variability in balancing and insufficient process controls.

CircumstanceMaintenance

A chip detector message on the preceding flight was deferred under the onboard MEL before departure from Dubai.

Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 2 | PDF page 3Find this passage in evidence search
Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQLSignificant aircraft system reported messages | Printed page 3 | PDF page 4Find this passage in evidence search

Read alongside

These comparisons connect specific research topics. Shared circumstances do not establish identical causes. Evidence from both investigations is provided below.

Qantas Flight 32

Both investigations involved Qantas A380s with Trent 900 engines and component manufacturing or assembly findings. At Dubai in 2014, gearbox damage interrupted accessory drive after inadequate bearing joint clamping. On Qantas 32 in 2010, a thin-walled oil feed pipe cracked, releasing oil that ignited and led to an uncontained turbine disc failure with structural and systems damage.

Read supporting evidence
ATSB final reportSafety summary | Printed page iii | PDF page 5Find this passage in evidence search

Further investigation records

Explore the records below for additional context. They open on the publisher's site and are not all included in our report search. Source reuse terms apply.

Sources and transparency

GCAA investigation completed. Summary report issued 22 March 2017.

Source limitations

The GCAA completed a short investigation and issued a summary report under the Annex 13 final-report standard.

Uncommanded Engine In-flight Shutdown: Qantas Airbus A380-842 VH-OQL

UAE GCAA AAIS
Final investigation summary report AIFN/0005/2014, issued 22 March 2017

Official report PDF, hosted by gcaa.gov.ae

Open source document

8 PDF pages.

GCAA copyright. Original analysis and limited quotations with attribution. Source terms.

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Editorial record

Kevin Murphy writes the incident accounts on AirlineIncidents.com, out of a long interest in aviation safety and the lessons each investigation leaves behind.

Prepared by
AirlineIncidents editorial desk
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Revision history

: GCAA completed summary report issued 22 March 2017.

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AirlineIncidents.com. Qantas VH-OQL accident account. Published 22 October 2026. https://airlineincidents.com/incidents/qantas-vh-oql-2014/

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