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Printed page 5. PDF page 7.
have been identified: � The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy. The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations ofOpen final report at PDF page 7BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 61. PDF page 63.
and the resolution (approximately 200 ft) of the FDR result in recorded data which is insufficient for an exact determination of the altitude. As substitutes were used: The altitude measured by the height monitoring unit (HMU) Linz (Austria) 25 minutesOpen final report at PDF page 63BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 76. PDF page 78.
position to safely execute the transferred and additionally assumed tasks. A reason was the insufficient number of air traffic controllers during the night shift resulting from the duty schedule which did not ensure a continuous staffing of the workstations. ItOpen final report at PDF page 78BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 79. PDF page 81.
described. These objectives have not been achieved as the descriptions of the procedures were insufficient and unclear. With the statements, "assists pilots in operation of the aircraft" and "Nothing in the procedures shall prevent pilots-in- command from exercising their bestOpen final report at PDF page 81BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 91. PDF page 93.
during the investigation of the accident: � Several controllers at ACC Zurich were only insufficiently informed about operating the ra- dar system in the fallback mode. Operation in this degraded mode was not regularly trained, nor had suitable guidance documentationOpen final report at PDF page 93BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 96. PDF page 98.
relative velocity till only several seconds before the collision. The remain- ing time was insufficient to decide on a course of action and affect a change in the aircraft flight path. Note: An examination of these problems regarding visual acquisitionOpen final report at PDF page 98BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen