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Printed page 34. PDF page 36.
investigation included an analysis of the system functionalities of the radar data display in fallback mode and of the STCA. The Swiss BFU made a report and the results have become a part of our investigation and are presented inOpen final report at PDF page 36BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 37. PDF page 39.
correlated radar image will not be available any more. The controller has then to work in the fallback mode. In the fallback mode the radar image is generated in the fallback radar computer (fbRDPS). As the fbRDPS has no connectionOpen final report at PDF page 39BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 38. PDF page 40.
requires, however, appropriate input from the controller in each individual case. If the fallback mode is selected because the MV computer failed neither the optical nor the acoustical STCA is available. In the night from 1 July 2002 to 2Open final report at PDF page 40BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 39. PDF page 41.
MV9800 computer. At 21:13 hrs, the ICWS at the sector SUED were switched over to the fallback mode. The isola- tion was finished at 21:18 hrs, i.e. an automatic correlation of new radar targets did not occur any more. TheOpen final report at PDF page 41BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 83. PDF page 85.
requirements. When the ATCO was approached by technicians to switch his workstation to the fallback mode he was unaware of any factors that would have indicated it was inappropriate. However, the ATCO (as with most interviewed ATCO's at ACC Zurich)Open final report at PDF page 85BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen
Printed page 84. PDF page 86.
develop- ments, as he perceived them, e.g.: � When the radar system was switched to the fallback mode the controller remembered that the separation was now 7 NM. � When he issued a new transponder code to the B757-200 andOpen final report at PDF page 86BFU AX001-1-2/02: collision near Ueberlingen