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Printed page 261. PDF page 279.
Safety Board concludes that the fuel/air vapor in the ullage of TWA flight 800's CWT was flammable at the time of the accident. Early in the investigation, questions were raised about whether a Jet A fuel/air explosion in the CWT,Open final report at PDF page 279NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800
Printed page 306. PDF page 324.
strike. 6. The fuel/air vapor in the ullage of TWA flight 800's center wing fuel tank was flammable at the time of the accident. 7. A fuel/air explosion in the center wing fuel tank of TWA flight 800 would haveOpen final report at PDF page 324NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800
Printed page 120. PDF page 138.
commercial jet airplanes based on the assumption that fuel tanks are considered to always be flammable and has required manufacturers to demonstrate that any energy inside the tank would be below the MIE for Jet A vapors to ensure safeOpen final report at PDF page 138NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800
Printed page 175. PDF page 193.
T347 terminal strip to observe and document the deposits' breakdown in the presence of flammable jet fuel vapor. The results of this research, described in reports from Evans-East Laboratories353 and the AFRL/UDRI,354 revealed that these silver-sulfide deposits accumulateOpen final report at PDF page 193NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800
Printed page 216. PDF page 234.
tank location. According to the report, some fuel tanks already have a low exposure to flammable conditions. For example, the FTHWG calculated that wing tanks are flammable approximately 7 percent of the fleetwide operational time. Further, results from the FTHWG'sOpen final report at PDF page 234NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800
Printed page 217. PDF page 235.
proposed new regulatory action on new aircraft designs that would limit the development of flammable conditions in the fuel tanks, based on the intended fuel types, to less than 7 percent of the expected fleet operational time, or provide meansOpen final report at PDF page 235NTSB AAR-00/03: In-flight breakup, TWA flight 800