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Printed page Unnumbered title and synopsis. PDF page 1.
International Airport. While the flight crew was preparing for the landing in Halifax, they were unaware that a fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the aircraft. About 13 minutes after the abnormal odour was detected,Open final report at PDF page 1TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 152. PDF page 164.
completion of the landing would have been at approximately 0127. In reality, the crew were unaware of the existence of an on-board fire and assessed the source of smoke and fumes as the air conditioning system; the Air Conditioning SmokeOpen final report at PDF page 164TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 181. PDF page 193.
with a direct impact on a third party. In some cases, the third party appeared to be unaware of these obligations. Moreover, assumptions were made by IFT and its subcontractors that type-specific information, both operational and technical, would be providedOpen final report at PDF page 193TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 212. PDF page 224.
have been shown to be flammable in subsequent testing. Most aircraft crews are likely unaware that under certain conditions, a fire could ignite significant flammable materials in hidden areas of aircraft and spread rapidly. Had the pilots been aware thatOpen final report at PDF page 224TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 214. PDF page 226.
ANALYSIS Initially, the crew was unaware that smoke was present in the hidden areas above the cockpit ceiling and cabin attic space. After the smoke was detected in the cockpit, communications took place between the piOpen final report at PDF page 226TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 258. PDF page 270.
the passenger cabin readied for landing and to dump fuel, were consistent with being unaware that an on-board fire was propagating. 8. Air traffic controllers were not trained on the general operating characteristics of aircraft during emergency or abnormal situations,Open final report at PDF page 270TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water