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Printed page vi. PDF page 6.
1.14.3 Designated Fire Zones and Smoke/Fire Detection and Suppression . . . . 108 1.14.4 Time Required to Troubleshoot in Odour/Smoke Situations . . . . . . . . . . 109 1.14.5 Risk of Remaining Airborne - EmergencyOpen final report at PDF page 6TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 109. PDF page 121.
avionics compartments, also known as electrical and electronic equipment bays. 1.14.4 Time Required to Troubleshoot in Odour/Smoke Situations It can take time for odour or smoke to develop to the concentration necessary for the crew to cognitively establish that theyOpen final report at PDF page 121TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 144. PDF page 156.
the accelerated grain growth caused the deformation and fracture to occur before the time required to initiate a leak. For comparison, similar testing was conducted using CRES steel caps instead of the aluminum caps. With the CRES steel caps, thereOpen final report at PDF page 156TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 255. PDF page 267.
the applicable checklist for the MD-11 could take 20 to 30 minutes to complete. The time required to complete such checklists could allow anomalies, such as overheating components, to develop into ignition sources. 5. The Swissair Smoke/Fumes of Unknown OriginOpen final report at PDF page 267TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 257. PDF page 269.
along the Swissair Flight 111 flight path after the initial odour in the cockpit, the time required to complete an approach and landing to the Halifax International Airport would have exceeded the time available before the fire-related conditions in theOpen final report at PDF page 269TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 269. PDF page 281.
with respect to in-flight firefighting. The identified safety deficiencies increase the time required to assess and gain control of what could be a rapidly deteriorating situation and reflect a weakness in the efforts of governments and industry to recognize theOpen final report at PDF page 281TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water