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Printed page 75. PDF page 87.
therefore, it is very likely that this selector was in the NORM position when the recorders stopped recording. 1.11.4 Lack of CVR Information The CVR in the occurrence aircraft had a 30-minute recording capacity; this met the existing regulatory requirements.Open final report at PDF page 87TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 100. PDF page 112.
thrust mode, and to maintain power at the last validated throttle angle. As the FDR had stopped recording, the EPR values were not available. The last recorded thrust settings obtained from the FADEC before the engine was shut down wereOpen final report at PDF page 112TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 166. PDF page 178.
the wires. The left emergency AC bus lost power shortly before the flight recorders stopped recording. It is unknown whether any or all of the remaining emergency or battery buses were eventually affected, but it is known that none ofOpen final report at PDF page 178TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 193. PDF page 205.
fragment at the start of this second transmission was recorded 1.4 seconds before the CVR stopped recording. 1.18.8.21 Loss of First Officer's Display Units At 0125:16, the first officer advised the captain that he was just flying, and not doingOpen final report at PDF page 205TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 214. PDF page 226.
recorded mention of smoke having been detected in the cabin at any time before the CVR stopped recording. If smoke had been detected in the cabin area, it is expected that the cabin crew would have relayed this information toOpen final report at PDF page 226TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 243. PDF page 255.
selected the CABIN BUS switch to the OFF position at 0123:45 and when the flight recorders stopped recording at 0125:41, the fire-related effects in the cockpit began. This is confirmed by the rapid succession of systems-related failures. The environmental conditionsOpen final report at PDF page 255TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water