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Printed page 134. PDF page 146.
the left emergency AC bus remote controlled CB. If this arcing was connected to the lead event, the loss of this bus would have been obvious to the pilots, and the loss of associated systems would have been recorded onOpen final report at PDF page 146TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 136. PDF page 148.
could not be placed in the reconstruction mock-up, its potential involvement in the lead event could not be assessed from a systems perspective. Exhibit 1-3796 was recovered as part of the bundle of entangled wires (Exhibit 1-4372) that contained theOpen final report at PDF page 148TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 254. PDF page 266.
initiation event; however, it could not be determined whether this arced wire was the lead event. 7. There were no built-in smoke and fire detection and suppression devices in the area where the fire started and propagated, nor were theyOpen final report at PDF page 266TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 66. PDF page 78.
The subject of AD 93-04-01 was to “prevent display units from going blank, which could lead to momentary loss of flight critical display information.” This AD took effect on 2 April 1993 and referred to ASB MD-11 A24-51, which tookOpen final report at PDF page 78TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 135. PDF page 147.
arcing event occurred as a result of fire-related damage, and was not connected to the lead ignition event. 1.14.11.4 Nine Arced Wires - Locations Not Determined The nine exhibit numbers discussed in this section are 1-3700, 1-3713, 1-3718, 1-3796, 1-4689,Open final report at PDF page 147TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 137. PDF page 149.
circuit function. Exhibit 1-3796 was also assessed for its potential to be connected to a lead arcing event in the area forward of the cut-out in the top of the cockpit rear wall, behind the avionics CB panel. Such aOpen final report at PDF page 149TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water