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Printed page 70. PDF page 82.
use their best judgment in handling situations not specifically covered, because it is impossible to detail procedures for all emergency situations. Information provided reminds controllers that “when an emergency occurs, time is of the essence, so all questions must beOpen final report at PDF page 82TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 73. PDF page 85.
attempts, some of the audio information recorded by the CAM on the CVR was difficult or impossible to decipher because of masking, either by the ambient cockpit noise, or by background ATS radio communications emanating from the cockpit speaker. TheOpen final report at PDF page 85TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 170. PDF page 182.
arcing event involving a low ampere circuit could readily ignite a fire. Since it is impossible to know whether these conditions exist in any given situation, a tripped CB should not be reset before any associated fault is located andOpen final report at PDF page 182TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 204. PDF page 216.
markings, identifying specific chips on circuit boards was very difficult and at times impossible. Honeywell, the manufacturer of the majority of the avionics used on the MD-11, provided technical assistance in identifying these NVM memory devices. It would aid accidentOpen final report at PDF page 216TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 244. PDF page 256.
airspeed, heading, and altitude) on DU 2, DUs 1 and 3 had failed and it would have been impossible to restore these two displays. Although all three 115 V AC generator buses were functional at the time of impact, fireOpen final report at PDF page 256TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 247. PDF page 259.
inoperative before the aircraft could have landed. Under such conditions, it would have been impossible to stop the aircraft on the available runway even if it could have landed. Based on these factors, it is evident that even if theOpen final report at PDF page 259TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water