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Printed page 18. PDF page 30.
the top of Galley 2, as Galley 2 was not electrically powered and not in service. A silicone elastomeric end cap was placed over the vent duct to close it off. The cap was located between the aft side ofOpen final report at PDF page 30TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 118. PDF page 130.
however, this branch was not connected to Galley 2 and the branch was closed off with a silicone elastomeric end cap (see Figures 4 and 6). The vent connection to Galley 2 was not made because Galley 2 was notOpen final report at PDF page 130TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 142. PDF page 154.
materials include insulation blanket cover materials, splicing tapes, polyethylene foam, and silicone elastomeric end caps. 142 TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARDOpen final report at PDF page 154TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 167. PDF page 179.
polyimide insulation. The three right emergency AC bus cables were also wrapped in a silicone elastomer-coated glass fibre braided electrical sleeving to provide additional protection. The additional mechanical protection provided on the cables in the 91 As defined in MOpen final report at PDF page 179TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 211. PDF page 223.
have contributed to the propagation and intensity of the fire. These materials included silicone elastomeric end caps; hook-and-loop fasteners; foams; adhesives; and different kinds of splicing tapes used in the construction, installation, and repair of insulation blanketsOpen final report at PDF page 223TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water
Printed page 236. PDF page 248.
that a small propagating flame front breached, to some extent, the exposed Galley 2 silicone elastomeric vent cap. This vent cap is located immediately adjacent to the forward end of the muff assembly, next to the cockpit rear wall, adjacentOpen final report at PDF page 248TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water