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Swissair 111

Printed page 4. PDF page 16.

(It is unknown whether visible smoke was still present in 0123:45 10:16 the cockpit) 0124:09 13:07 Decision made to divert to Halifax, Nova Scotia 13:31 Decision made to dump fuel 0124:42 CABIN BUS switch selected to OFF 0125:02 14:04 Autopilot
Open final report at PDF page 16TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water

Swissair 111

Printed page 151. PDF page 163.

first systems failure event apparent to the pilots-the disconnect of the autopilot at 0124:09-would have occurred on the landing approach in the vicinity of the Golf beacon, approximately 5 nm from the threshold of Runway 06. The aircraft would have
Open final report at PDF page 163TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water

Swissair 111

Printed page 188. PDF page 200.

had been reported in the cabin area. 1.18.8.5 Multiple Systems Failures Starting at 0124:09, and for the next 92 seconds, the FDR recorded a number of technical failure events that were associated with the failure of aircraft systems, as discussed
Open final report at PDF page 200TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water

Swissair 111

Printed page 189. PDF page 201.

would also be an aural warning tone; this aural warning tone was heard, beginning at 0124:09 and continuing until the CVR ceased to record. At 0124:18, the captain noted, and the first officer confirmed, that the autopilot had disconnected. At
Open final report at PDF page 201TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water

Swissair 111

Printed page 243. PDF page 255.

indication to the pilots of a systems-related failure was the disconnect of the autopilot at 0124:09 (see Section 1.18.8.6). Twenty-four seconds prior to this, at 0123:45, the captain had selected the CABIN BUS switch to the OFF position. This selection
Open final report at PDF page 255TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water

Swissair 111

Printed page 247. PDF page 259.

much altitude or airspeed to land. 2.20.3 Effect of Fire-Related Failures on Landing At 0124:09, nearly three minutes before the earliest possible landing time, the aircraft had started to experience an increasingly rapid succession of systems-related failures. The pilots
Open final report at PDF page 259TSB A98H0003: In-flight fire leading to collision with water