Original words, traceable pages

Search the evidence

Search report text, read a short matching passage, then open the source page.

Exact phrases match first; otherwise all words must occur close together. Six excerpts maximum. Text extraction cannot search image-only charts. Warsaw uses a report transcription with missing figures and appendices.

12 matching PDF pages. Showing 6 short source excerpts. Open the document for full context.

Qantas 72

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 9.

not manage a scenario where there were multiple spikes in AOA from one ADIRU that were 1.2 seconds apart. The occurrence was the only known example where this design limitation led to a pitch-down command in over 28 million flight
Open official document at PDF page 9ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008

Qantas 72

Printed page Front matter. PDF page 18.

significantly deviated from the other two values, the FCPCs used a memorised value for 1.2 seconds. The FCPC algorithm was very effective, but it could not correctly manage a scenario where there were multiple spikes in either AOA 1 or
Open official document at PDF page 18ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008

Qantas 72

Printed page 73. PDF page 93.

‘monitoring theshold'), the most recent valid AOAFCPC input value was memorised and used for 1.2 seconds. During this memorisation period, the current values for AOA 1 and AOA 2 were not used for determining AOAFCPC input. At the end of
Open official document at PDF page 93ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008

Qantas 72

Printed page 74. PDF page 94.

end of the memorisation period would trigger a new memorisation period. Spike values 1.2 seconds apart Following the 7 October 2008 occurrence, the aircraft manufacturer identified a scenario in which deviations in only one of the three AOA values could
Open official document at PDF page 94ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008

Qantas 72

Printed page 76. PDF page 96.

at the actual value, while AOA 1 has two large-value spikes with the second present 1.2 seconds after the start of the first . The calculation of AOAFCPC input is as follows: Before the first spike, the average of
Open official document at PDF page 96ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008

Qantas 72

Printed page 83. PDF page 103.

associated with the THS. Summary The simulation studies showed that spikes in AOA 1 values 1.2 seconds apart could lead to the FCPCs sending pitch-down commands to the elevators, and that these commands were consistent with the elevator deflections observed
Open official document at PDF page 103ATSB AO-2008-070: In-flight upset, VH-QPA, 7 October 2008