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Printed page 194. PDF page 196.
requirements for the Air Data System. However, the design of MCAS relying on input from a single AOA sensor, made this Flight Control System susceptible to a single failure of AOA malfunction. During the accident flight, the scenario was initiatedOpen final report at PDF page 196Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 195. PDF page 197.
vane and the Right ADIRU uses the right AOA vane). The MCAS software uses input from a single AOA sensor only. Certain failure or anomalies of the AOA sensor corresponding to the master FCC controlling STS can generate an unintendedOpen final report at PDF page 197Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 196. PDF page 198.
failure condition had been assessed as more severe than Major, the decision to rely on single AOA sensor should have been avoided. MCAS Function The MCAS specifications called for the system to limit its ability to move the horizontal stabilizerOpen final report at PDF page 198Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 206. PDF page 208.
requirements for the Air Data System. However, the design of MCAS relying on input from a single AOA sensor, made this Flight Control System susceptible to a single failure of AOA malfunction. 16. During the single and multiple failure analysisOpen final report at PDF page 208Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 215. PDF page 217.
appropriate and met all certification requirements. 3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from that sensor. 4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim inOpen final report at PDF page 217Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 269. PDF page 271.
fault trees was conducted to determine if and how Boeing considered the effects of a single AOA sensor providing a "loss of data" or "misleading data (erroneous data)" to aircraft systems. The review found that Boeing did consider the effectsOpen final report at PDF page 271Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04