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Printed page xviii. PDF page 20.
shaker which were active throughout the flight. The flight crew was able to stop the repetitive MCAS activation by switched the stabilizer trim to cut out. After landed in Jakarta, the flight crew reported some malfunctions, but did not includeOpen final report at PDF page 20Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 93. PDF page 95.
scenario was for the flight crew to feel the control column forces during single and repetitive MCAS activations while trying to keep the aircraft level. The AOA bias was introduced and the MCAS function activated. The observations were as follows:Open final report at PDF page 95Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 179. PDF page 181.
indicated that the force exerted was insufficient to maintain aircraft altitude. During the repetitive MCAS activations, the Captain managed to control the aircraft altitude when the pitch trim was maintained above 5 units by commanding the ANU pitch trim toOpen final report at PDF page 181Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 180. PDF page 182.
responses to the FO, his difficulty to maintain an assigned heading and altitude due to repetitive MCAS activation, and his failure to manage speed and thrust, and call out flap retraction points. The FO asked the controller of the aircraftOpen final report at PDF page 182Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 183. PDF page 185.
pitch corrections and nose up trim and did not use adequate electric trim to counter repetitive MCAS activations while controlling the aircraft. The Lion Air OM-part A related to handover control did not mention any requirement to describe specific handlingOpen final report at PDF page 185Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04
Printed page 190. PDF page 192.
the pilots would trim out uncommanded trim inputs to maintain control of the aircraft. Repetitive MCAS activations without adequate trim reaction by the flight crew would escalate the workload and hence failure effects should have been reconsidered. During FHA, theOpen final report at PDF page 192Aircraft Accident Investigation Report KNKT.18.10.33.04