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Printed page 14. PDF page 21.
the movements of Aircraft B as it was approaching the runway to land. Tower East was not aware that Aircraft A was entering the runway. As Aircraft B passed near Taxiway C5 and Tower East was about to give AircraftOpen official document at PDF page 21JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report
Printed page 89. PDF page 96.
crew members, who were the last to evacuate from L4, and the airport authorities were not aware of the situation. In addition, the company has been conducting training for ground staff on emergency evacuation measures based on the safety measuresOpen official document at PDF page 96JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report
Printed page 113. PDF page 120.
Aircraft A had entered the runway and remained on the runway. Aircraft B, which was not aware that Aircraft A had entered the runway, continued its landing approach, and collided with Aircraft A immediately after the touchdown. As a resultOpen official document at PDF page 120JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report
Printed page 115. PDF page 122.
takeoff (2.1.2.1 and Appendix 1). (7) It is highly probable that PIC A and FO A were not aware that Aircraft B was approaching the runway and was about to land (Appendix 1). (8) Aircraft A received radio communications fromOpen official document at PDF page 122JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report
Printed page 121. PDF page 128.
Tokyo Fire Department firefighters who were involved in the firefighting activities were not aware of the danger of dust generated from CFRP combustion residues. In addition, although the Japan Transport Safety Board had educated air accident investigators about the dangerOpen official document at PDF page 128JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report
Printed page 46. PDF page 53.
difficult to reply on, as it sometimes displayed warnings even when runway occupancy was not actually overlapping and in addition there was no sound alarms, and did not consider it to be a system that would support visually situational awareness.Open official document at PDF page 53JTSB Haneda collision: first interim report