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Helios Airways 522

Printed page 106. PDF page 118.

hypoxia effects can be so subtle and insidious that "A flight crew operating under a high workload on the flight deck may not fully appreciate or recognize the initial symptoms of hypoxia. It is therefore possible that judgment may be
Open final report at PDF page 118AAIASB 11/2006: Helios Airways HCY522

Helios Airways 522

Printed page 123. PDF page 135.

this effect. At the time of onset of the MASTER CAUTION (and the OVERHEAD indication), workload in the cockpit was already high. The crew was facing a loud warning horn and 123
Open final report at PDF page 135AAIASB 11/2006: Helios Airways HCY522

Helios Airways 522

Printed page 130. PDF page 142.

maximum capacity for the primary task of flying the aircraft and making decisions; � the workload is equally distributed among the crew members, so that excessive workload for any individual is avoided; and � a coordinated cooperation - including the
Open final report at PDF page 142AAIASB 11/2006: Helios Airways HCY522

Helios Airways 522

Printed page 144. PDF page 156.

reviewed. The number of employed personnel was insufficient in relation to the actual workload. The mission and strategy of each Section, including its processes and standard operating procedures, appeared not to be officially laid out in writing. Selection and training
Open final report at PDF page 156AAIASB 11/2006: Helios Airways HCY522

Helios Airways 522

Printed page 153. PDF page 165.

fan situation and did not detect the problem with the pressurization system. 15. The workload in the cockpit during the climb was already high and was exacerbated by the loud warning horn that the flight crew did not cancel. 16.
Open final report at PDF page 165AAIASB 11/2006: Helios Airways HCY522

Helios Airways 522

Printed page 105. PDF page 107.

lead operators to ignore these signals [1, 2]. In particular, in the event of a heavy workload, insensitivity to aural warnings may be caused by a conflict between these warnings and the cognitive tasks in progress. The ability to turn
Open official document at PDF page 107Final Report: Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447