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G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 34.

aircraft manufacturer stated that the rise in the cabin altitude while level at FL250 was probably due to a combination of one outflow valve being stuck open in its last position (following the loss of AC Bus 1), and the
Open official document at PDF page 34AAIB final report: G-ONEE

G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 37.

exist. This was demonstrated when GCU 4 was replaced on the aircraft, and with GCU 1 then probably dry, the aircraft powered up with no system faults. The internal examinations of both GCU 1 and 4 showed evidence of corrosion
Open official document at PDF page 37AAIB final report: G-ONEE

G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 38.

FL250 the cabin altitude began to climb from 3,000 ft to a maximum of 9,246 ft. This was probably due to one outflow valve being stuck open in its last position (due to the loss of AC Bus 1) and
Open official document at PDF page 38AAIB final report: G-ONEE

G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 39.

Inflight' chapter of the QRH. The pitch and power required by the memory items would probably have produced near level flight, or a slight climb, and would have prolonged the time that the aircraft was subjected to icing conditions. With
Open official document at PDF page 39AAIB final report: G-ONEE

G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page 17. PDF page 19.

cockpit. At around 2 h 08, the crew made a course change of 12 degrees to the left, probably to avoid returns detected by the weather radar. At 2 h 10 min 05, likely following the obstruction of the Pitot
Open official document at PDF page 19Final Report: Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447

G-ONEE: electrical failures and unreliable airspeed

Printed page 52. PDF page 54.

contacted him to correct its estimate. The SAL controller replied that the estimate was probably later. He asked the DAKAR controller if there was any change. The DAKAR controller then said that he was going to try to contact flight
Open official document at PDF page 54Final Report: Accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447