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Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 19.
from them. During an inadvertent overspeed, crews are generally advised to keep the autopilot engaged and use speedbrakes, unless it is not effectively correcting the condition, in which case manual control may be required with awareness of possible abrupt pitchOpen official document at PDF page 19AAIB final report: G-ONEE
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 20.
KIAS. Manually reset to VMO as needed. When descending at speeds near VMO/MMO with the autopilot engaged, short-term airspeed increases above VMO/MMO may occur... These short- term increases are acceptable for this maneuver and the autopilot should adjust the pitchOpen official document at PDF page 20AAIB final report: G-ONEE
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 39.
an erroneous reduction in IAS and the triggering of an ias disagree caption. With the autopilot engaged in flch mode, the system responded by commanding increasing nose-down pitch to maintain the selected airspeed. Although the crew added thrust, the frozenOpen official document at PDF page 39AAIB final report: G-ONEE
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 42.
conditions, and although they were aware of the ias disagree message, they decided to keep the autopilot engaged to reduce workload. This coincided with a temporary handover of flying control between the PF and PM for the crew to checkOpen official document at PDF page 42AAIB final report: G-ONEE
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 1.
resulting in all three airspeed indicators indicating an erroneously low airspeed. The autopilot remained engaged and pitched the aircraft nose-down to regain indicated airspeed. The pitch reached 7.6° nose-down with an associated 6,240 ft/min descent rate, before the airOpen official document at PDF page 1AAIB final report: G-ONEE
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 9.
the unreliable airspeed event (Figure 5) shows that throughout this period the right autopilot was engaged, the autothrottle was disengaged, the pitot, Total Air Temperature (TAT) and Angle of Attack (AOA) heat faults were active, and the AOA recorded valuesOpen official document at PDF page 9AAIB final report: G-ONEE