Search report text, read a short matching passage, then open the source page.
Exact phrases match first; otherwise all words must occur close together. Six excerpts maximum. Text extraction cannot search image-only charts. Warsaw uses a report transcription with missing figures and appendices.
13 matching PDF pages. Showing 6 short source excerpts. Open the document for full context.
Printed page 81. PDF page 95.
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report � stall training that involves fully developed stall profiles (in addition to the approach- to-stall profiles that are currently required) and a demonstration of the stick pusher system; � the FAA's oversight of ColgOpen final report at PDF page 95NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 126. PDF page 140.
During training for private and commercial certificates, pilots perform recoveries from fully developed stalls. Even though these stall recoveries are typically accomplished in small trainer-type airplanes, the sensations and lessons from this training usually remain withOpen final report at PDF page 140NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 127. PDF page 141.
of their training) rather than as a maneuver with an element of surprise. However, a fully developed stall is an unplanned, emergency situation in which the airplane's nose must be pushed down to reduce the AOA. Third, the simulator trainingOpen final report at PDF page 141NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 128. PDF page 142.
stall in the Q400 and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and Part 142 training centers toOpen final report at PDF page 142NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 132. PDF page 146.
Boeing's testing, however, did not evaluate pilot performance in upset recoveries with fully developed stall scenarios. The NTSB notes that among the contributing causes to the Airborne Express/Narrows accident (previously discussed in section 2.9) was the company's DC-8Open final report at PDF page 146NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 133. PDF page 147.
simulator, then it is essential that the simulator be approved for this training beyond the fully developed stall AOA. Simulator improvements to the high AOA flight characteristics will reduce the likelihood of negative training. The NTSB concludes that pilots couldOpen final report at PDF page 147NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407