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Printed page 12. PDF page 26.
that the first officer, as a monitoring pilot, was always ahead of the airplane and cross-checked her actions. Other captains indicated that, because of her abilities, the first officer could have upgraded to captain. None of the captains interviewed afterOpen final report at PDF page 26NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 41. PDF page 55.
threat and error countermeasures such as briefing, contingency planning, and monitor/cross-checking, but they also include higher- order concepts such as leadership and establishing open communication in the cockpit. Similarly, TEM includes crew countermeasures, but itOpen final report at PDF page 55NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 47. PDF page 61.
Colgan also responded with address information for its EWR-based pilots, which the NTSB cross-checked against the FAA's airmen certification database between April 9 and 13, 2009. Of the 137 addresses provided by Colgan, 136 were found in the FAA's database.Open final report at PDF page 61NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 76. PDF page 90.
an appendix addressing standard operating procedures for flight crew monitoring and cross-checking. The appendix provided examples of standard operating procedures that emphasized that monitoring was a primary responsibility of both flight crewmembers. The appendix alsOpen final report at PDF page 90NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 92. PDF page 106.
perform and their effect on her ability to reliably provide the expected monitoring and cross-check. As a result, he should have been especially focused on the flight instruments during these periods. However, he did not notice the rising low-speed cueOpen final report at PDF page 106NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 93. PDF page 107.
accidents, the NTSB found that, for 31 of these accidents, inadequate monitoring and/or cross-checking had occurred.214 The study also found that flight crewmembers frequently failed to recognize and effectively draw attention to critical cues that led to the accident sequOpen final report at PDF page 107NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407