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Printed page 26. PDF page 40.
overload failure; no evidence indicated any preimpact failures. Flight control continuity could not be determined because of severe fragmentation and burn damage. The airplane impacted the south side of the house near ground level, and pieces of the airplane traveledOpen final report at PDF page 40NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 85. PDF page 99.
that the reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence but that the first officer's tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likelyOpen final report at PDF page 99NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 88. PDF page 102.
demonstration of the stick pusher during simulator training for that airplane.201 However, it could not be determined whether the captain had seen a stick pusher demonstration on the Q400. Even if the captain had seen this demonstration, his actions inOpen final report at PDF page 102NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 91. PDF page 105.
although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training. 2.2.4 Captain's Management of Flight The capOpen final report at PDF page 105NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 151. PDF page 165.
9. The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence, but the first officer's tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely reducedOpen final report at PDF page 165NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407
Printed page 152. PDF page 166.
Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training. 16. The Q400 airspeed indicator lacked low-sOpen final report at PDF page 166NTSB AAR-10/01: Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air 3407