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Printed page 5. PDF page 19.
from both engines. The engines initially responded but, at a height of about 720 ft, 57 seconds before touchdown, the thrust of the right engine reduced. Some seven seconds later, the thrust reduced on the left engine to a similarOpen official document at PDF page 19Aircraft Accident Report 1/2010: Boeing 777-236ER, G-YMMM, London Heathrow Airport, 17 January 2008
Printed page 37. PDF page 51.
outbound sector and the accident flight. However, the accident flight record ended about 457 seconds prior to the initial impact and did not include the final seconds of the approach and touchdown. The QAR, unlike the DFDR, recorded the positionOpen official document at PDF page 51Aircraft Accident Report 1/2010: Boeing 777-236ER, G-YMMM, London Heathrow Airport, 17 January 2008
Printed page 139. PDF page 153.
system icing. Final approach The right engine ceased responding to autothrottle demands 57 seconds before the touchdown and within seconds the crew became aware that there was a problem with the engine thrust control of both engines. This presented theOpen official document at PDF page 153Aircraft Accident Report 1/2010: Boeing 777-236ER, G-YMMM, London Heathrow Airport, 17 January 2008
Printed page 228. PDF page 242.
simulation also indicated that the sequence of fuse pin failure was rapid, with only 0.057 seconds between the first and last of the failures. The soft ground impact model (Run C), which was intended to most closely match the actualOpen official document at PDF page 242Aircraft Accident Report 1/2010: Boeing 777-236ER, G-YMMM, London Heathrow Airport, 17 January 2008