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Printed page xi. PDF page 14.
the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of theOpen final report at PDF page 14NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214
Printed page 10. PDF page 28.
about 122 knots, the descent rate was about 900 fpm, and the PAPI indication changed to four red lights, showing the airplane's significantly below-glidepath position. Over the next 5 seconds, the airplane's pitch attitude increased to about 7� nose up,Open final report at PDF page 28NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214
Printed page 11. PDF page 29.
PAPI at 500 ft RA and recalled thinking that if he allowed the PAPI indication to go to four red lights, he would fail his flight and would be embarrassed.23 The PF pitched the airplane up to avoid going low.Open final report at PDF page 29NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214
Printed page 57. PDF page 75.
and a significantly low glidepath as evidenced by the calculated PAPI guidance cues of four red lights. 1.16.1.1 Workstation Simulation The nominal 777-200ER simulation model provided a good match for the airplane's previous normal landing and an adequate match forOpen final report at PDF page 75NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214
Printed page 84. PDF page 102.
the glidepath since, about 2 or 3 seconds earlier, the PAPI indication had changed to four red lights, showing that the airplane was significantly below glidepath. Both the airspeed indication, which was more than 5 knots below target approach speed,Open final report at PDF page 102NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214
Printed page 86. PDF page 104.
angle, so it is uncertain whether he made an error in not noticing the PAPI change to four red lights. 86Open final report at PDF page 104NTSB AAR-14/01: Asiana Airlines 214