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Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 14.

lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of that extension, which increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would re
Open official document at PDF page 14Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page 32. PDF page 46.

interval. Further, Boeing design engineers were not consulted about nor aware of the extended lubrication interval specified in the MSG-3 documents. The FAA's MD-80 MRB chairman testified at the public hearing that the longer interval in the MSG-3 documents was
Open official document at PDF page 46Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page 180. PDF page 194.

lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of that extension, which increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would re
Open official document at PDF page 194Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page 33. PDF page 47.

Alaska Airlines, who reviewed and accepted the 1996 lubrication interval extension, the extended MSG-3 interval (3,600 flight hours or 15 months, whichever comes first) was presented as justification for the interval increase. In October 1996, jackscrew assembly lubricat
Open official document at PDF page 47Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page 142. PDF page 156.

more disconcerting considering that, in April 1996, Alaska Airlines had significantly extended the lubrication interval for the horizontal stabilizer and associated components from 1,600 flight hours to 8 months (the equivalent of about 2,250 flight hours). That interval
Open official document at PDF page 156Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines 261

Printed page 147. PDF page 161.

interval extension, Alaska Airlines presented documentation of the manufacturer's recently extended recommended interval as justification for its increase. (The extended recommended lubrication interval in the MRB report and OAMP document derived from the MSG-3 guidance was e
Open official document at PDF page 161Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000