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Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 14.
trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval and tOpen official document at PDF page 14Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 22. PDF page 36.
1966, 1 year after the DC-9 went into service, the discovery of several assemblies with excessive wear resulted in the development and implementation of an on-wing end play check procedure to measure the gap between the acme screw and nutOpen official document at PDF page 36Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 38. PDF page 52.
was comparable to the DC-8 wear rate of 0.001 inch per 1,000 hours.80 As a result of excessive wear rates discovered through this sampling program, Douglas issued Douglas Design Memorandum C1-250-DES-DC9-683 in February 1967. The memorandum stated that DC-9 operatorsOpen official document at PDF page 52Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 42. PDF page 56.
1984, McDonnell Douglas examined six jackscrew assemblies that had been reported to have excessive wear. However, McDonnell Douglas could not examine the jackscrew assembly removed in 1990 because it was not delivered for inspection. 87 The Safety Board confirmed thatOpen official document at PDF page 56Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 62. PDF page 76.
relay, and the trim brake override switch were examined. No evidence of thermal damage or excessive wear was observed on either the down-trim or the up-trim relay contacts. Corrosion was observed on all metal components of both trim relays. NoOpen official document at PDF page 76Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 105. PDF page 119.
stabilizer. Metallic shavings in the vicinity of the horizontal stabilizer indicate excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly. Such excessive wear, if not corrected, could result in possible loss of pitch trim capability, which could result in loss of vertical controlOpen official document at PDF page 119Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000