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37 matching PDF pages. Showing 6 short source excerpts. Open the document for full context.
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 6.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 1.16.3 Shear Load Capability of the Acme Nut Threads . . . . . . .Open official document at PDF page 6Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 8.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 2.3.4 Abnormal Loading of the Acme Nut Threads . . . . . .Open official document at PDF page 8Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 14.
the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were AOpen official document at PDF page 14Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 22. PDF page 36.
Report (revised July 14, 1997) indicated that no contingency for the complete loss of the acme nut threads was incorporated into the design for the longitudinal trim control system. According to the fault analysis, the acme nut was designed withOpen official document at PDF page 36Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 38. PDF page 52.
procedure was conducted during bench checks to determine whether the wear rate of the acme nut threads was comparable to the DC-8 wear rate of 0.001 inch per 1,000 hours.80 As a result of excessive wear rates discovered through thisOpen official document at PDF page 52Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000
Printed page 42. PDF page 56.
assemblies removed and returned to the company was 0.043 inch. The report stated that the acme nut threads were “worn and serrated.” The report added that “it should be noted that lubrication cycle of jackscrew has been sporadic on thisOpen official document at PDF page 56Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, January 31, 2000