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Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 43.
classifications by which SSIs were excluded from directed supplemental inspections was that of "damage obvious or malfunction evident." An example of a structure that meets this classification is wing skin, where surface cracks are evident through fuel- leakage, and fuselageOpen official document at PDF page 43NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711
Printed page 68. PDF page 74.
included in the supplemental inspections. Because Boeing defined the fuselage skin as "damage obvious or malfuction evident" if it cracks, the fuselage skin was excluded from directed supplemental inspection. Other manufacturers use different criteria and include primaryOpen official document at PDF page 74NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711
Printed page 73. PDF page 79.
the fuselage minimum gage skin due to damage tolerant design which was classified as "damage obvious" or "malfunction evident" because of the controlled decompression scenario. The aviation industry premise that airplanes can be operated in a safe airworthiness conditionOpen official document at PDF page 79NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 82.
Action) (A-89-67) Discontinue classification of fuselage skin as "malfunction evident" or "damage obvious” on supplemental structural inspection documents. In addition, review all the remaining structurally significant items in the damage obvious category for possible inclusiOpen official document at PDF page 82NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 73.
occurrence of MSD, the difficulties that may be encountered in detecting this type of damage and the catastrophic failure that may result from such damage, full-scale fatigue testing to a minimum of two projected service lifetimes should be required forOpen official document at PDF page 73NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711
Printed page label not indexed. PDF page 260.
Lockheed believes that MSD will not appear in the pressure shell until other obvious damage has been detected. This is based on low stress levels, good detail design, and the extensive test program conducted which substantiated this conclusion. Boeing believesOpen official document at PDF page 260NTSB AAR-89/03: Aloha Airlines flight 243, N73711