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Printed page xi. PDF page 13.
2.8.2.5 STEEP AUTHORITY GRADIENT 185 2.8.3 APPOINTMENT OF AVIATION/AEROSPACE MEDICINE 187 SPECIALISTS 2.8.4 ORGANISATION CHART 188 2.8.5 ORGANISATION CULTURE 188 2.9 OTHER ORGANISATIONS 189 2.9Open official document at PDF page 13Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020
Printed page 104. PDF page 128.
facility. The two aspects that stood out were the poor maintenance of AIXL simulator and steep authority gradient amongst the cockpit crew. CAR section 8, series C Part I Para 4.2 states that “An operator shall establish, for each aerodromeOpen official document at PDF page 128Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020
Printed page 105. PDF page 129.
accurately calculate the LDA/LDR, especially for wet and contaminated runway conditions. A steep authority gradient between the crew was evident, wherein the First Officers tended to look over their shoulder even for routine SOP actions. Simulator training was carried outOpen official document at PDF page 129Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020
Printed page 185. PDF page 209.
activity should have been granted higher status and included in their KRAs. 2.8.2.5 STEEP AUTHORITY GRADIENT Para 1.17.5.4 of VT- AXV Mangalore accident report 2010 of Air India Express states that “in this accident, the first officer had been ableOpen official document at PDF page 209Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020
Printed page 186. PDF page 210.
aircraft controls and executing a missed approach procedure. Another adverse effect of ‘steep authority gradient' in this crash was ‘conformity'. The FO could have communicated useful safety actions (to ‘go around') but failed to do so assertively. The steep authorityOpen official document at PDF page 210Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020
Printed page 187. PDF page 211.
The steep authority gradient in the company is evident by the very wordings of the Ops Manual. To illustrate this with an example, para 23.13 of OM Part A, states, “The take-off speeds, V1,Open official document at PDF page 211Final Investigation Report: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 VT-AXH, Kozhikode, 7 August 2020